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Abstract: In this study we constructively argue that the relationship 
between FDI flows and the per capita GDP for the MENA countries has a 
novel feature-hitherto unrecognised-which can partially explain the great 
difficulty of the MENA region in attracting FDI. We show the existence of 
a separatrix, or trap, in terms of the per capita GDP: To the left of the trap, 
the change in the flow of FDI as a percentage of GDP declines as the per 
capita GDP rises. To the right of the trap, the change in the flow of FDI as 
a percentage of GDP rises with an increase in per capita GDP. Thus, in 
order to attract FDI, as our results show, the MENA countries must achieve 
a critical level of economic development in terms of the per capita GDP-
otherwise FDI flows will be extremely sluggish. From the dataset available 
for 16 countries during 1996-2013, we find the per capita income trap is at 
US$ 10,000. In other words, the FDI to GDP ratio is a non-linear function 
of the per capita GDP for the MENA region. In fact, we find the function to 
be inverse S-shaped: For per capita incomes less than $10,000, the function 
is concave-as per capita GDP rises, FDI as a percentage of GDP rises at a 
declining rate. Beyond this critical value of per capita GDP 
(trap/separatrix), the function becomes convex: As per capita GDP rises 
above the trap, FDI as a percentage of GDP then rises at an increasing rate. 
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Introduction 
It is a time-honored adage that Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) can promote economic growth and 
development in the host country by increasing the 
volume and productivity of investment (Borensztein et al., 
1998). There is no gainsaying to the fact that FDI flows, 
though cyclical in nature, have been mammoth: The size 
of FDI flows reached a staggering level of $1,475 billion 
a decade ago before the global financial crisis, which 
started recovering after 2011 and reached $1.7 trillion in 
2015. Despite their attempts to seek greenfield 
investments by creating appropriate institutions, the 
Middle East and North African (MENA) countries have 
recorded the lowest regional share (EIU, 2015, pp. 19). 
On an average the region attracts about 5% of the global 
FDI flows during the last forty years. More importantly, 
the resource rich countries of the MENA receive the 
major share of the regional FDI flows to their oil sector 
while the resource poor nations have been traditionally 
ignored by overseas investors (O’Sullivan et al., 2011). 
The recent political crisis in the form of the Arab Spring 
further accentuated the regional crisis: In late 2010 66% 
of the $64b FDI to the region went to the resource rich 
and labour-importing nations. Within a year of the crisis, 
resource poor nations of the region experienced a sharp 
decline (46%) in FDI flows and Ucal et al. (2010) 
blamed the global financial crisis for this unprecedented 
decline in FDI. However, Onyeiwu (2003) postulated a 
long-term and structural problem for the MENA 
countries to host FDI flows. Yet the profession is not 
fully convinced that there is something fundamentally 
wrong for the region, which is located strategically 
between the Western World and the powerhouse of the 
global economy (China and India). The major 
contribution of the paper is to empirically detect if the 
region suffers from any fundamental flaws to act as a 
productive host to FDI flows. This is no mean task as 
data for MENA countries pose a serious challenge for all 
researchers. Based on data availability; 16 MENA 
countries out of 22 have been included in this study over 
a period of 20 years including the incident in the form of 
the Arab Spring. These countries are Algeria, Egypt, 
Lebanon, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, 
Morocco, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, 
Tunisia, Libya and Yemen. To the best of our 




knowledge, governance variable has not been estimated 
in FDI area in the MENA region especially after Arab 
Spring Revolutions, which is part of the period this study 
covers. A very interesting finding, hitherto unknown in 
the literature, is that the relationship between FDI flows 
and economic progress measured by per capita income 
(GDP) can display a non-linear function for MENA 
countries, such that the intermediate levels of per capita 
income can act as a trap making the regional FDI flows 
to the MENA regions extremely sluggish. The region 
can only enjoy significant FDI inflows only if the per 
capita GDP exceeds the trap, which can have significant 
policy implications for the region. 
An important, yet largely unsettled, issue is the 
relationship between economic development (per capita 
income) and FDI flows as the panel study across nations 
failed to provide a concrete lead due to the pooling 
assumption of the panel data analysis. This implicit 
assumption requires one to impose a common set of 
parameters across different nations with diverse and 
evolving institutional qualities that have unknown and 
differential impacts upon FDI flows. As a direct 
consequence, it is appropriate to apply the panel data 
analysis to understand the dynamic relationship between 
FDI flows and (per capita) income within a regional group 
of nations. This is what we seek to undertake in this study. 
It is also important that one should consider a short 
time-horizon to reduce the possibility of abrupt and 
diverse changes in local institutions within the group. 
The objective of this paper is to understand the impacts 
of per capita income on the level of FDI flows in a 
geographic region to avoid the above pitfalls of applying 
the panel data analysis. To the best of our knowledge, 
governance, or political stability variable and nonlinear 
functions have not been estimated in the context of FDI 
in the MENA region especially after Arab Spring 
Revolutions, which is part of the period this study 
covers. We also consider a relatively short period from 
1996 to 2013 to assess the relationship between FDI 
flows and their non-linear relationship with per capita 
income for the MENA region. The organization of the 
paper is as follows: We offer the basic model in section 
2 and provide the empirical findings in section 3 and 
conclude in section 4. 
Simple Model 
Our central concern is to examine the effects of per 
capita income on FDI flows for the 16 MENA countries. 
In this study we undertake a panel study to examine the 
impact of per capita income on the FDI flows for these 
16 nation over a period ranging from 1996 to 2013, 
which will offer valuable insights into the relationship 
between per capita income and FDI flows in the short-
run for three sets of reasons. First and foremost, our 
basic idea is that individual relationships of 16 countries 
should have the same parameter linking per capita 
income to FDI flows since the levels of economic 
development and institutional qualities-though not 
homogeneous-are roughly consistent. As a result, the 
pooling assumption will allow us to employ the standard 
panel study to understand the impact of the per capita 
income on FDI flows in the region. Secondly and more 
importantly, the panel study will also enable us to 
overcome the problem of omitted variables. Finally, the 
short panel will reduce the possibility of sharp and 
sudden changes in the policy environment in the region. 
In other words, our findings will help better 
understand the short-run dynamics of FDI to the region, 
which suggests that regulatory standards, at the early 
stage of development when income is low, set by 
national governments are relatively low and hence FDI 
increases sluggishly with growth in income. As income 
continues to rise from a low level, the priority of policy 
makers undergoes changes to pave institutional changes 
for attracting quality FDI flows. Once the income level 
has reached a critical threshold, policy makers take steps 
to ensure that FDI flows can continue unimpeded as 
income increases. Three basic models will be examined-
namely, log linear, quadratic and cubic-to explore the 
shape of the relationship between per capita income (Yi) 
and FDI as a percentage of GDP flows (Xit) to the 
MENA region. Our three distinct models are as follows: 
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Generally, the optimal FDI to GDP ratio (Xit) of a 
country depends on country’s specific and 
macroeconomic factors explained by different theories in 
economics. The optimal FDI to GDP ratio structure can 
be captured for the country i at time t as shown in 
equation. Note that Xit labels the FDI flow as a 
percentage of GDP of the host country i in year t while 
Yit is the per capita income of country I in year t. Further 
details of the equations will be provided in section 3.  
Data and Control Variables 
Our dependent variable is (FDI/GDP)it,or Xit, which 
is the FDI to GDP ratio of country i in year t and 
PCGDPit is the per capita GDP/income of country i at 
tear t. The control variables are the standard ones, which 
we choose after excluding variables with high correlation 
coefficients in Table 1 of the appendix. Note that EXit 
represents the exchange rate of country i in year t, PPPit 
is the purchasing power parity of country i in year t, 




GDPit represents the real GDP of country i in year t, 
INFit is the inflation rate of country i in year t, POLRit 
represents political stability/governance of country i in 
year t, POPit is the population of country i in year t, 
OPENit is the openness index of country i in year t and εit 
is the error term in Equation 1d. 
The model applied in this study has been developed 
to investigate intra-MENA FDI over the 1996-2013 
period. The main data sources are World development 
Indicators, Global Governance Indicators and Pen World 
international (Table 1 in the appendix for definitions of 
variables and their measurements and data sources). Based 
on data availability; we choose the following countries: 
Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Oman, United Arab Emirates, 
Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Kuwait, Iraq, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen. To the best of 
our knowledge, governance/political stability variable has 
not been estimated in FDI area in the MENA region 
especially after Arab Spring Revolutions, which is part of 
the period this study covers.  
Empirical Analysis 
This section contains a brief overview of the 
determinants of FDI flows and regional characteristics for 
the MENA region during 1996-1013. The MENA 
countries experienced uneven growth and also fluctuating 
flows of FDI across different countries. As a result, 
significant measures have been taken by national 
governments to induce FDI flows. For us the dependent 
variable (FDI flows) is called X in Table 2 and measured 
by the logarithm of the ratio of FDI to GDP. In Table 2 
we represent X by LnFDI_GDP to reflect the precise 
definition of the FDI flows for the econometric study. We 
capture the economic development of a country by the per 
capita GDP (Y) variable, which is expressed as 
Ln_PCGDP. Note that economic development is the 
logarithm of per capita GDP in constant US dollar in 
Table 1. The other control variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. We utilise the panel data from sixteen major 
countries in the region from 1996 to 2013 to understand 
the relationship between LnFDI_GDP and Ln_PCGDP to 
explain the slow growth in FDI for the entire region. In 
total our dataset consists of 306 observations. Data on 
relevant variables are collected from various sources as 
explained in Appendix 1 in Table 1. The estimated results 
are summarized in Table 2. To avoid multicollinearity we 
choose the lagged values of GDP, POLR, EX, PPP, POP, 
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FDI and Income: Basic Findings 
As discussed already, we consider the variable 
LnFDI_GDP to capture the flows of FDI, which is used 
as a proxy for FDI inflows to the region while FDI is 
widely recognized as the major source productivity 
growth for the region. In order to explore the dynamic 
effect of per capita (real) GDP on the FDI, this paper 
focuses on the linear and non-linear relationship between 
LnFDI_GDP and Ln_PCGDP. The link between 
national FDI inflows and the national per capita GDP is 
empirically examined by means of a set of logarithmic 
regression models. Our argument rests on the idea that 
the FDI varies with the level of economic development 
(represented by the per capita GDP) and the relationship 
between the two variables is non-linear-it takes the form 
of a wave-like pattern. 
In order to better explain our results, we define the 
elasticity of FDI-to-GDP ratio (X) with respect to per 
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Note that in Equation 2 we have ignored the time (t) 
and country (i) subscripts. 
As we explore the possibility of a non-linear 
relationship between FDI and economic development, it 
is important that we allow the possibility of a quadratic 
or even cubic relationship. By making use of the 
logarithmic functional form in this study, we are able to 
overcome the problems associated with large order of 
magnitude and our results are not qualitatively affected. 
The estimation results are presented in Table 2. 
Elasticity of FDI to Per Capita Income: Some 
Interesting Insights 
Based on the results presented in Table 2, the 
estimated model (in log values) can be written as 
follows, where Xit and Yit are the logarithmic 
transformation function to the base of 10 of the FDI to 
GDP ratio and per capita income (PCGDP) of country 
i in year t. We only explain Model 3 in what follows 
since all models are basically consistent and robust in 
showing the influence of the control variables and per 
capita GDP: 
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Equation 3a can be used to derive the estimated 
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Table 1. Variables of interest and data sources Appendix 1 
Variable initial Variable/Data source 
FDI Foreign direct investment/world development indicators * 
GDP Gross domestic production/world development Indicators* 
EX Exchange rate/world development Indicators 
PPP  Purchasing power parity/world development Indicators 
INF Inflation/World development Indicators 
POLR Political stability/The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
PCCGDP Per Capita GDP (Yit)* 
L. Lag  
GMM Generalized moments method 
POP Population in Millions  
OPEN Openness indicator/world development indicators 
Xit Ratio of FDI to GDP 
*: Constant US dollar 
 
Table 2. Baseline regression with alternative formulations 
Dependent Variable=X= LnFDI_GDP 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 Model 1 (FE)  Model 2 (RE)  Model 3 (GMM) Model 4 (GMM) 
Ln_PCGDP 0.083*** 4.7*** 0.063* 4.2*** 6.48*** 6.30*** 
Ln_PCGDP2  -1.17***  -1.05*** -1.67*** -1.62*** 
Ln_PCGDP3  0.097***  0.086*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
L.LnGDP -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.01 0.0004  
INF 0.108*** 0.11*** 0.99*** .10*** 0.086*** 0.08*** 
LnPOP 0.024* 0.02* 0.015 0.01 0.014 0.009 
LnEX 0.0028 0.003* 0.003 0.003* 0.003 0.002 
L.LnPPP -0.003 -0.007 -0.0025 -0.004 -0.02* 0.006** 
LnPOLR 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.004 0.005** 0.008*** 0.003 
L.X     0.36*** 0.41*** 
L.LnOPEN 0.056*** 0.05*** 0.055*** .05*** 0.41*** 0.04*** 
Constant -0.83*** -4.51* -0.38*** -5.7***  -8.34*** 
 FE FE RE RE One Step One Step 
Adjusted R-square 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.30 
Hausman test Accept FE estimation. Accept FE estimation. 
Note: *, **, *** are significant at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. FE: Fixed Effect, Re: Random Effect, GMM: SGMM: L: The 
lag operator, Ln: Logarithmic transformation 
 
The change in elasticity ηit with respect to Yit 
(Ln_PCGDPit), ignoring the time and country subscripts, 
can be written as: 
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Equation 3b suggests that the elasticity is not fixed. 
The relationship between the elasticity of FDI and per 
capita income depends on the level of economic 
development level, i.e., per capita GDP. The effect is 
strongly reflected in the estimated cubic models. Equation 
3c suggests that a 1% increase in Ln_PCGDP in a country 
in the MENA region causes 0.84% increase in the increase 
in the rate of FDI flows measured by Ω. However, if the 
per capita income is static, then Ω declines by -3.34 
ceteris paribus. This gives us the critical value of 
Ln_PCGDP (= X = 3.97) till which Ω declines. Beyond 
this critical value, Ω increases. Thus the per capita GDP 
of $10,000 acts as a trap, which lowers the change in the 
elasticity of FDI to the PCGDP as the PCGDP rises for 
PCGDP<$10,000. Beyond $10,000, as the PCGDP rises, 
so does the elasticity of inflow of FDI with respect to the 
per capita GDP. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship given 
by Equation 3c such that OY* is the trap in terms of 
PCGDP (=$10,000). Schedule AA' describes the U-shaped 
relationship between Ω and PCGDP (Y). The change in 
elasticity of FDI as a percentage of GDP with respect to 
PCGDP (Ω) decreases for PCGDP<$10,000 as PCGDP 
rises. On the other hand, for PCGDP>$10,000, Ω rises as 
PCGDP increases. 
In a similar vein Fig. 2 describes the concave-convex 
relationship (LL') between η and PCGDP (Y): LL' is 
concave till the per capita income trap (OY*) such that as 
PCGDP (Y) increases, the elasticity of (η) increases as a 
decreasing rate. Beyond the trap, PCGDP>$10,000, η 
rises at an increasing rate for increases in PCGDP. 
For the control variables, we observe the following: (i) 
we note that the FDI-to-GDP ratio in the MENA countries 
can be explained by the lagged values of the level of 
economic development measured by the per capita GDP 
(PCGDP). (ii) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) variable has 




impacts that are uncertain. (iii) the lagged value of (log) 
GDP that does not seem to have any statistically significant 
effect on the FDI flows in the MENA region. Thus, the 
market size does not seem to exert significant influence on 
FDI flows. (iv) it is instructive to note that macroeconomic 
variables like inflation (INF), quality of political 
regime/governance (POLR), openness indicator (OPEN), 
accelerate the pace of FDI mobility to the region-as 
expected. (v) though the size of population (LnPOP) seems 
to enhance the FDI flows, yet the statistical significance is 
not always observed. This, once again, suggests that the size 
of market does not seem to play an important role in 
determining FDI flows for the MENA countries. 
As the results establish, our main contributions to the 
literature are three fold: First, we show the existence of a 
separatrix, or trap, in terms of the per capita GDP, which 
is labelled as as Y* in Fig. 1. This trap creates 








Fig. 2. The Dynamics of η and the per capita GDP (PCGDP): Concave-convex relationship 




In the existing literature, the existence and consequences 
of nonlinearities between Ω and Y did not arise as an 
important facet in the context of FDI and development. 
Ours is the first paper that shows the existence of 
nonlinearities in this context. As a result, prior studies-
based on linear, or log-linear, relationships-could have 
given incorrect conclusions. Secondly, we note 
interesting consequences of the nonlinearities: To the left 
of the trap (Y*), the change in the flow of FDI as a 
percentage of GDP declines as the per capita GDP rises. 
To the right of the trap, the change in the flow of FDI as 
a percentage of GDP rises with an increase in per capita 
GDP. Thus, in order to attract FDI, as our results show, 
the MENA countries must achieve a critical level of 
economic development in terms of the per capita GDP-
otherwise FDI flows will be extremely sluggish. From 
the dataset available for 16 countries during 1996-2013, 
we find the per capita income trap is at US$ 10,000 for 
MENA countries. Thirdly, we find the relationship 
between Ω and Y to be inverse S-shaped: For per capita 
incomes less than $10,000, the function is concave-as per 
capita GDP rises, FDI as a percentage of GDP rises at a 
declining rate. Beyond this critical value of per capita 
GDP (trap/separatrix), the function becomes convex: As 
per capita GDP rises above the trap, FDI as a percentage 
of GDP then rises at an increasing rate. 
It is important to note that nonlinearities are 
recognized as important characteristics of growth 
economics such that regression parameters are subject to 
various non-linear processes (Banerjee and Duflo, 2002; 
Durlauf et al., 2001; Maasoumi et al., 2007 among 
many). However, in our work, we have reversed the 
causality: We have chosen FDI (Ω) as the dependent 
variable and per capita GDP (Y) as the independent 
variable to discover how GDP and GDP growth can 
create nonlinearities for FDI. 
For emerging nations, in an early work, Campos 
(2002) noted that the inflows of FDI do not depend on 
GDP or GDP growth once threshold effects are 
considered. Alfaro (2003) argued that the role of FDI 
and its attractiveness depends upon the specific sector 
where FDI flows take place. Sadni-Jallab et al. (2008) 
argue that there had been no interrelationships between 
FDI flows and GDP variables for the MENA nations. 
Jyun-Yi and Chih-Chiang (2008) did not find any 
evidence for 67 nations during 1975-2000 that GDP 
variables and FDI flows are interrelated. Thus, the past 
literature has not been able to pin down the specific 
interrelationships between FDI flows and GDP variables. 
In this very work, we find evidence of non-linear 
relationships between FDI flows and GDP variables after 
controlling for other important macroeconomic factors. 
Our findings can explain why the past literature did not 
find strong evidence of interrelationships since they 
postulated (log) linear functions. In the concluding 
section we explain our main findings. 
Conclusion 
The main empirical findings are two-fold: First, we 
find evidence that the FDI-to-GDP ratio in the MENA 
countries can be explained by the lagged values of the 
level of economic development measured by the per 
capita GDP. As expected, other macroeconomic and 
political variables have anticipated impacts on the FDI 
flows for the MENA countries. The exceptions are the 
following: (i) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) variable, 
whose impacts are uncertain, while (ii) the lagged value 
of (log) GDP that does not seem to have any statistically 
significant effect on the FDI flows in the MENA region. 
On the other hand, variables like inflation (INF), quality 
of political regime/governance (POLR), openness 
indicator (OPEN), seem to accelerate the pace of FDI 
mobility to the region. Though the size of population 
(LnPOP) seems to enhance the FDI flows, yet the 
statistical significance is not always observed. 
Secondly, we also assess the non-linear impacts of 
economic development on the FDI flows to the region. 
We argue that the FDI flows are not a free lunch as the 
national governments must create suitable conditions to 
attract FDI to their nations. As seen above, there are 
known factors that promote FDI flows. We also find 
empirical support to the plausible thesis that low levels of 
economic development of the receiving nation acts as a 
barrier to FDI flows. We also note that there is an 
automatic (correction) mechanism that improves the FDI 
flows to MENA countries only after a nation’s per capita 
income reaches a threshold level ($10,000). Our paper is 
the first one to highlight the possibility of a developmental 
trap that increases the sluggishness of FDI to the MENA 
region. We show the existence of a threshold of per capita 
income Y* by using the FDI and per capita income data 
from the MENA region. For Y<Y* (= 10,000), an increase 
in per capita GDP increases FDI to GDP ratio at a 
declining rate. We note that for Y>Y*, interestingly, the 
impact of per capita GDP on the FDI flows undergoes a 
sea change: Any increase in per capita GDP above Y* 
increases the inflow of FDI-as GDP rises-at an increasing 
rate. The implications of our findings are two-fold: First of 
all, we observe a complex and non-linear relationship 
between FDI flows (Xit) and per capita GDP(Yit) in the 
MENA region. Our finding is novel and extremely 
significant in the context of economic development as we 
are able to show a virtuous relationship between economic 
development and FDI flows above the development trap 
(Y*). Thus, if MENA countries seek to enhance FDI 
flows, these countries must also unleash relevant 
economic policies to enhance their per capita income. 
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